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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 14-1537 
 ___________ 
 
 MARK YAKUBOV, 
        Petitioner 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
    Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A071-316-352) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Leo A. Finston 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 19, 2014 
 Before:  HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: October 7, 2014) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Mark Yakubov petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) 
final order of removal.  The BIA dismissed Yakubov’s appeal from the Immigration 
Judge’s (“IJ”) order that he be removed to Israel or, in the alternative, to Russia.  We will 
grant the petition for review and vacate the BIA’s ruling that Yakubov is not entitled to 
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deferral of removal from Russia on the merits.  As we shall explain, our ruling does not 
disturb the IJ’s order that Yakubov be removed to Israel and the Government is free to 
effectuate that order. 
I. 
 Yakubov, a Jewish citizen of Russia, was admitted to the United States as a 
refugee in 1995 and later adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident.  Yakubov’s 
admission followed his severe beating by three policemen in the Russian Republic of 
Dagestan that left him in a coma for four days and the hospital for one month.  Yakubov 
attributes the beating to anti-Semitism.   
 In 2010, Yakubov pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in violation of N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 2C:5-1 and 2C:18-2, and to unlawful possession of a handgun in violation of 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-5(b).  The trial court sentenced him to four to seven years in 
prison.  The Government ultimately charged him as removable for having been convicted 
of (1) a firearm offense, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C), and (2) the aggravated felony of 
attempting to commit a burglary, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G), (U), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  
Yakubov conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal and 
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) on the ground that he faces 
persecution and torture on account of his religion if removed to Russia. 
 The IJ found Yakubov’s testimony credible but denied his application and ordered 
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his removal to Israel or, alternatively, to Russia if Israel does not accept him.1  In 
particular, the IJ concluded that Yakubov had been convicted of an aggravated felony and 
a “particularly serious crime” that renders him ineligible for asylum or withholding of 
removal.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  That ruling—which 
Yakubov did not challenge before the BIA and has not challenged on review—left 
deferral of removal under the CAT as Yakubov’s only potential form of relief.  The IJ 
denied deferral of removal on the merits, and the BIA dismissed Yakubov’s appeal on the 
merits as well.  Yakubov petitions for review. 
II. 
 Yakubov has never contested his removability per se or claimed that he faces any 
mistreatment if removed to Israel.  He also did not seek any relief from removal to Israel 
before the BIA and has not sought any such relief on review.  Instead, his sole challenge 
is to the Agency’s alternative order of removal to Russia.  Although our jurisdiction over 
final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) generally gives us jurisdiction to 
review alternative orders of removal, we conclude that Yakubov’s challenge is 
premature. 
 Deferral of removal may be granted only if the applicant “establish[es] that it is 
more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country 
                                                 
1 Yakubov requested removal to Israel in the event the IJ found him removable and 
testified that, although he has never resided in Israel, he has “a lot of relatives there.” 
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of removal.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (emphasis added); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) 
(requiring deferral of removal when an alien satisfies this standard but is ineligible for 
withholding).  In this case, Israel is “the proposed country of removal,” while Russia is 
merely an alternative proposed country of removal.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(f) 
(contrasting “the country” of removal designated by the IJ with “countries in the 
alternative”).  “Under the plain wording of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16, an applicant is not 
entitled to adjudication of an application for withholding of removal to a country that 
nobody is trying to send them to.”  Su Hwa She v. Holder, 629 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 
2010).   
 There is no indication of record that the Government is or may become unable to 
remove Yakubov to Israel and, although we express no opinion on the issue, we note that 
Israel generally permits Jews to settle there under its Law of Return.  See Fox v. Clinton, 
684 F.3d 67, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 §§ 1-3 
(1949-1950), as amended by Law of Return (Amendment 5714-1954)).  Thus, Yakubov’s 
claim for deferral will not become ripe unless and until the Government’s efforts to 
remove him to Israel prove unsuccessful.  See Su Hwa She, 629 F.3d at 956 & n.7. 
 For this reason, we will vacate the BIA’s order to the extent that it affirmed the 
IJ’s denial of Yakubov’s claim for deferral of removal to Russia on the merits and will 
remand for the BIA to dismiss his appeal instead on the ground that Russia is not 
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presently “the proposed country of removal.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).2  Because 
Yakubov did not challenge his removal to Israel before the BIA, there is no basis for the 
BIA to engage in any further proceedings at this time.  Thus, our ruling does not disturb 
Yakubov’s order of removal to Israel.  That order remains in effect and the Government 
is free to effectuate it.  If the Government is unable to remove Yakubov to Israel, then 
Yakubov may file a motion to reopen with the BIA seeking a ruling on the merits of his 
claim for deferral of removal to Russia at that time.  Cf. Su Hwa She, 629 F.3d at 961, 
965.  Yakubov’s unsupported request in his reply brief for release on bail is denied. 
                                                 
2 Although the IJ’s resolution of this claim on the merits was premature for the same 
reason the BIA’s resolution was premature, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for us 
to direct the BIA to remand to the IJ for a similar disposition at this time.  The IJ has 
developed a factual record on this claim and, if consideration of this claim on the merits 
becomes appropriate in the future, the BIA can decide in its discretion whether a remand 
to the IJ for further factfinding is warranted. 
 
